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RENO v. ACLU: THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPT
TO REGULATE PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET
FAILS FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1999, an estimated 200 million personal computer users will
access the Internet on a regular basis.' In 1996, in an effort to regulate this new medium, Congress passed Title V of the Telecommunications Act, also known as the Communications Decency Act
(CDA).2 Mter the CDA received presidential approval, forty-seven
plaintiffs3 filed suit against the Attorney General of the United
States and the Department of Justice. 4 The plaintiffs alleged that
sections 223(a)5 and 223(d)6 of the CDA were facially unconstitu1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. CL 2329, 2337-38 (1997).
See id. at 2339 nn.27-28. The 47 plaintiffs included organizations and corporations such as the National Press Photographers Association, American Civil
Liberties Union, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, America Online, Apple Computer, CompuServe, Magazine Publishers of America, and
Microsoft Corporation. See id.
See id.
47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (Supp. 1998). This section provides in pertinent part:
(a) Prohibited general purposes Whoever- (1) in interstate or foreign
communications (A) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly (i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates the transmission
of, any comment request, suggestion, proposal, image or other communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent,
with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person; (b)
by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment,
request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which
is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of
such communication placed the call or initiated the communication
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the
intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18,
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
[d.
47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (Supp. 1998). This section provided in pertinent part:
(d) Sending or displaying offensive material to persons under 18
Whoever-( 1) in interstate or foreig!1 communications knowingly-(A)
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tional. 7 The challenged provisions were aimed to protect individuals
under eighteen years of age from receiving harmful communications over the Internet. s The plaintiffs asserted that sections 223(a),
which prohibited knowingly transmitting obscene or indecent communications to minors,9 and 223(d), which prohibited knowingly
sending or displaying sexually explicit messages that were patently
offensive to minors,1O violated their First Amendment free speech
and Fifth Amendment due process rights}1
Mter conducting an evidentiary hearing,12 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a preliminary injunction preventing the government from enforcing both
provisions. 13 The Government appealed directly to the Supreme
Court.14 The issue before the United States Supreme Court was
whether sections 223(a)and 223(d) of the CDA violated both the
uses an interactive computer service to send a specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of
age, any comment request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the
user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication;
or (2) Knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such
person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph(1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be
fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.

7.

[d.
See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 826 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Twenty plaintiffs filed

suit immediately after the statute was signed by President William Clinton,
challenging the constitutionality of both sections 223(a) and 223(d). See Reno,
117 S. Ct. at 2339. The district judge entered a temporary restraining order,
but only against the enforcement of section 223(a) as it applied to indecent
communications. See id. Thereafter, twenty-seven plaintiffs filed a second suit
challenging the same two provisions. See id. The two suits were consolidated
and heard by a three-judge panel of the district court as permitted under section 561 of the Act. See id.
8. See Reno,117 S. Ct. at 2331.
9. See supra note 5.
10. See supra note 6.
11. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 849.
12. See id. at 827.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 826. The Government directly appealed to the Supreme Court as permitted by the statute. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 234041 (1997) (applying 47 U.S.C. § 561 (Supp. 199~».
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First lS and Fifth 16 Amendments because of overbreadth and
vagueness. 17
The United States Supreme Court resolved the First Amendment issue in Reno v. ACLU,18 Certain language in the statutory provisions abridged the right to freedom of speech protected under
the First Amendment. 19 The Court deemed the provisions facially
unconstitutional,2o Finding the statutory provisions in violation of
the First Amendment,21 the Court did not resolve the question of
whether the vagueness of both provisions violated the Fifth Amendment. 22 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court announced that
the Internet deserves the highest degree of protection against governmental intrusion because it is the most participatory form of
mass communication ever created. 23
In order to explain the Supreme Court's First Amendment inquiry in Reno, Section II of this Note details several past Supreme
Court cases that establish the parameters from which the Reno
Court worked to resolve the issue presented,24 as well as a history of
the medium examined by the Reno Court-the Internet. 25 In Section
III, this Note summarizes the facts, opinion, and rationale of the
Reno decision. 26 Section IV critiques the Court's opinion and con15. U.S. CoNST. amend. I. This Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the basic freedoms of speech, religion, press, and assembly and the right to petition
the government for redress of grievances. See id.
16. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. This Amendment to the Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces. or in the Militia.
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life. liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
[d.
17. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2341(1997).
18. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
19. See id. at 2334.
20. See id. at 2340.
21. See id. at 2334.
22. See id. at 234546.
23. See id. at 2343.
24. See infra notes 32-132 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 13~9 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 170-259 and accompanying text.
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eludes that the majority reached the appropriate result.27 It was not
surprising that the language of the CDA lacked the specificity and
narrowness required by the First Amendment in light of the fact
that Congress enacted a version of the CDA that was never the subject of a senatorial hearing, but merely discussed for approximately
one hour on the Senate floor. 28 Thereafter, Section IV of this Note
explores Justice O'Connor's alternative approach taken in analyzing
the CDA's provisions at issue in her concurring and dissenting opinion. 29 Section IV addresses the impact Reno had on Congress and
the Executive, focusing particularly on the Internet Indecency Act:legislation passed in an effort to correct the constitutional infirmities of the CDA.30 This Note concludes that this newly enacted legislation adequately revised the provisions struck down in Reno and appears constitutionally defensible. 31
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. First Amendment Parameters

The United States Supreme Court has reviewed numerous constitutional challenges to government regulations of speech and expression. 32 From this precedent, it is clear that courts must balance
the government's interest in protecting its citizens from harmful,
obscene, and indecent materials33 with the individual's interest in
communicating or receiving communications. 34 It is equally evident
that the method of expression can have a decisive effect on the outcome in a given case-the same speech protected in one mediuIil
may not be protected in another. 35 The challenge facing the Reno
Court was balancing these interests in light of case precedent and
27.
28.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

35.

See infra notes 260-70 and accompanying text.
See Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2338 n.24 (1997).
See infra notes 271-306 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 307-48 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 349-53 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 35-131 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 35-131, 170-259 and accompanying text. This interest is particularly acute for minors. See infra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Wrginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 75fr57 (1976) (chronicling the Court's concern with the
rights of receivers and concluding that "if there is a right to advertise, there is
a reciprocal right to receive advertising"); Marcy Strauss, Redefining the CapttrJe
Audience Doctrine, 19 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q 85, 85 (1991) (noting the Court's
long history of considering both speakers and potential listeners in First
Amendment analysis).
See infra notes 102-20.
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applying this precedent to the Internet. Before dealing with the
Court's analysis, it is instructive to consider the relevant precedent
with which the Court dealt.
1. Content-Neutral Regulations of Adult Material

An initial inquiry in any First Amendment case centers on the
government act that is allegedly abridging expression. 36 The government can proceed in two distinct fashions when it interferes with
the marketplace of ideas. 37 First, the government might attempt to
regulate the content of the expression. 38 Generally, content-based
regulations of speech are viewed with greater contempt and heightened scrutiny by the courts. 39 Alternatively, the government might
create a restriction that is aimed at the time, place, and manner of
speech, thereby appearing neutral as to the speech's content. 40
Courts will normally permit content-neutral regulations provided
36.

37.

38.
39.

40.

See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Turt Liability, The First Amendment, and Equal Access to
Electronic NetwOTks, 5 HAAv. J.L. & TECH. 65, 114 (1992) (explaining that a state
action must exist to apply the First Amendment); see also Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that the First Amendment is applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995)
(observing that the state may regulate by either content-neutral or contentbased restrictions); Chase J. Sanders, Bearing the First Amendments Crosses: An
Analysis o/State v. Sheldon, 53 MD. L. REv. 494, 504-05 (1994) (explaining that
government regulations of speech are divided into two categories); see also
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 41 (1986) (noting that the two
categories of speech regulation are content-neutral and content-based).
See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-1, at 785 (2d
ed. 1988) (discussing the marketplace of ideas theory of free speech).
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 191 (1992) (holding that content-based
restrictions must be subjected to exacting scrutiny); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 n.6 (1989) (observing that content-based regulations
must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny)(citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 321 (1988»; Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S.
781, 798 (1988) (holding that a content-based regulation is subject to the most
exacting scrutiny); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (stating that content-based restrictions must be subject to the most exacting scrutiny).
See Burson, 504 U.S. at 196 (explaining that the Court has held that the government may regulate time, place, and manner of speech so long as the restrictions are content-neutral); Wanl, 491 U.S. at 791 (stating that the government may impose reasonable restrictions based on time, place, and manner);
Renton, 475 U.S. at 41 (stating that time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns,
453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981) (explaining that the Court has recognized the validity of time, place, and manner restrictions).
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. they are reasonable. 41 Thus, content-based regulations are far more
likely to fail First Amendment scrutiny than their content-neutral
counterparts. 42 However, a clear line of demarcation between the
categories may prove difficult to support in certain situations.
An illuminating illustration of this difficulty is City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc. 43 In Renton, the Supreme Court was petitioned
to resolve a First Amendment challenge to a city zoning ordinance
prohibiting adult motion picture theaters from being located within
1,000 feet of any residential zone, church, park, or within one mile
of any school. 44 Playtime Theatres purchased two theaters in downtown Renton, Washington, intending to use them as adult movie
theaters. 45 The theaters were located within the area regulated by
the ordinance. 46 Playtime Theatres sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the ordinance violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 47
The Supreme Court determined that the ordinance was not directed at regulating the content of the films shown in the theaters,
but rather the secondary effects that these types of theaters tend to
promote. 48 The Court analyzed the ordinance as a content-neutral
regulation because the predominant purpose underlying the ordinance. was to curtail the deleterious secondary effects that adult theaters have on a neighborhood, not to restrain any particular type of
communication. 49 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied
heavily on the city council's "predominant interests" in enacting the
ordinance which were deduced from the council's prolonged deliberationsso and stated intentions.51 The Court distinguished content41.

42.

43.
44.
45.
46.

47.
48.
49.
50.

See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 761 (holding that state
governments have the right to impose content-neutral restrictions); Wanl, 491
U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (holding that the city's regulation is content-neutral and,
therefore, valid under the First Amendment).
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34
STAN. L. REv. 113. 134 (1981) (explaining that content-based regulations will
be overturned in more instances than content-neutral restrictions).
475 U.S. 41 (1986).
See id. at 44.
See ilL at 45.
See ilL
See ilL
See ilL at 47.
See ilL at 46.
See id. at 47 (noting that the lower court's finding of the city council's intent
was "more than adequate to establish that the city's pursuit of its zoning interests here was unrelated to the suppression of free expression."). Specifically,
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based regulations from content-neutral time, place, and manner
regulations. 52 The Renton Court explained that content-based regulations are presumed to violate the First Amendment because they
chill expression of ideas or views,53 but content-neutral regulations
are acceptable "so long as they are designed to serve a substantial
governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. "54 The Renton Court held that the ordi-

51.

52.

53.

54.

the city council referred the matter to the planning and development committee. See ilL at 44. The committee held public hearings, researched the experiences of nearby Seattle, Washington, received advice from the city attorney's
office as to similar developments in other cities, and made recommendations
leading to the enactment of the challenged ordinance. See ilL
See ilL at 48 (noting that the ordinance was designed to prevent crime, protect
the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and preserve neighborhoods,
commercial districts, and the quality of urban life).
See id. at 4647. One commentator recognized the significance of this distinction as follows: "No longer will adult business location ordinances be analyzed
under the strict scrutiny standard ... which establishes a presumption of constitutional invalidity that the city must overcome. Instead, adult business location ordinances will be analyzed by the rational basis standard, which raises a
presumption of validity . . . ." Ronald M. Stein, &gulation of Adult Businesses
Through Zoning After Renton, 18 PAC. LJ. 351, 352 (1987) (footnotes and internal quotations omitted).
See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47; see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 782 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that
"[t]he Constitution in general does not tolerate content-based restrictions of,
or discrimination against, speech"); RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,382
(1992) (observing that "content-based regulations are presumptively invalid");
Carey v. Brown, 447 U;S. 455, 462 (1980) (discussing a statute that completely
banned all non-labor picketing, but exempted peaceful labor picketing at a
place of employment, and concluding that the statute was a content-based regulation); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94-95, 98-99 (1972)
(stating that a Chicago ordinance exempting peaceful labor picketing from its
general prohibition on picketing next to a school was a content-based regulation and opining that "above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message. its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content").
Renton, 475 U.S. at 47; see City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 791, 804-07, 812-15 (1984) (upholding a prohibition against posting signs on public property as a valid time, place, and manner restriction due
to the municipality's valid aesthetic concerns in limiting unpleasant forms of
expression, and observing that people can still post signs outside of the city or
within the city on private property); Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) ("Expression, whether oral or written or
symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions."). In Clark, the Court reasoned that such restrictions on speech are
valid if they are justified in some way without referring to the content of the
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nance served a substantial government interest-preserving the
quality of urban life-and allowed reasonable alternatives for communication. 55 Therefore, the ordinance survived the First Amendment challenge. 56
Commentators have criticized the Renton Court's conclusion
that the ordinance at issue was content-neutral,57 in effect, agreeing
with Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion that concluded the ordinance was content-based. 58 Additionally, commentators have drawn
attention to a footnote in which Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, notes that "it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser magni-

55.

56.

57.

58 ..

regulated speech, if the restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and if the restrictions leave open alternative methods
of communicating the speech in question. See Clam, 468 U.S. at 293; see also
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
643, 647-48, 654-55 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of a Minnesota rule
which required members of ISKCON to confine their distribution, sales, and
solicitation activities to a fixed location at the state fair, reasoning that the
rule was not content-based because it applied to all persons or organizations
wishing to sell and distribute material and that the state had a valid interest in
wanting to maintain the orderly movement of people at the fair, and noting
that alternative forums of expression existed outside of the fairgrounds).
See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54. The Court noted that the ordinance left approximately 520 acres, which equaled five percent of Renton's land area, available
for use as adult theater sites. See id. at 53. Laurence Tribe explains that decisions such as "Renton may signal the willingness of some members of the
Court to fashion rules for speech in public places which will try to accommodate the conflicting demands of individuals and communities to have government shield each from intrusion by the other." TRIBE, supra note 38, at § 1219, at 950.
See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54-55. As Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, explained: "In our view, the First Amendment requires· only that Renton refrain
from effectively denying respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and
operate an adult theater within the city, and the ordinance before us easily
meets this requirement." Id. at 54.
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L REv. 46, 104
(1987) (referring to Renton as a "disturbing" exception to the Court's protection of free speech); Leading Cases, Restrictive Zoning of Adult Theaters, 100
liAR. L REv. 190, 195 (1986) ("The Renton ordinance was a content-based regulation of the first order.").
See Renton, 475 U.S. at 55 (Brennan, j., dissenting) ("The Court asserts that
the ordinance is aimed not at the content of the films shown at adult motion
picture theaters, but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the
surrounding community, and this is simply a time, place, and manner regulation. This analysis is misguided." (citation and footnote omitted».
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tude than the interest in untrammeled political debate. '"S9 From
this footnote, it appears that at least Justice Rehnquist would support the view that low-value speech, such as sexually explicit cinematography, whether regulated in a content-based or content-neutral
manner is less deserving of First Amendment protection. 60 While it
is unclear whether this generalization is supported by a majority of
the Court, cases demonstrate that when indecent communication
rises to the level of obscenity, government regulations need not be
content-neutral to survive a First Amendment challenge.61
2. Obscene Material is not Protected by the First Amendment
Legislative efforts aimed at restricting what is deemed obscene
are not novel creations. 62 When lawmakers suppress obscene material, no violation of the First Amendment occurs because, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, obscenity is not a form of speech
worthy of First Amendment protection. 63 While several attempts of
59. See id. at 49 n.2 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,
70 (1976».
60. See Philip J. Prygoski, The Supreme Court's "Secondary Effects" Analysis in Free
Speech Cases, 6 COOLEY L. REv. I, 18 (1989); Stein, supra note 52 at 351 ("The
Supreme Court's acceptance of the time, place, and manner analysis set forth
by Justice Stevens in Young also signaled the Court's view that the type of expression at issue did not deserve the fullest protection.").
61. See Prygoski, supra note 60, at 18. Delving into the reason why Justice Rehnquist "alluded to Young for the proposition that the kind of speech restricted
by the Young and Renton ordinances was low-value speech, at least when compared to the core first amendment speech of political debate," one commentator observed:
The only tenable conclusion is that the value of speech is related to
the amount of first amendment protection the Court is willing to
give it. Justice Stevens made this argument and it was rejected by a
majority of the Court in Young. However, this argument appears to be
part of Justice Rehnquist's premise as he analyzed the ordinance in
Renton.

[d. (footnotes omitted).
62. See Martin Karo Be Marcia McBrian, The Lessons of Miller and Hudnut: On Prrr
posing a Pornography Ordinance that Passes Constitutional Muster, 23 U. MICH. J-L
REF. 179, 183-84 (1989) (tracing the history of laws restricting obscenity).
63. See Randolph Stuart Sergent, The ''Hamlet'' FaUacy: Computer Netwurks and the Geographic Roots of Obscenity Regulation, 23 HAsrINGS CoNST. L.Q 671, 681 (1996)
(stating that "implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance," and therefore
"not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press,") (quoting
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957»; Bruce A Taylor, Hard-Core
Pornography: A Proposal for a Per Se Rule, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 255. 255 (1988)
(citing Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705(1986»; Roth v. United
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defining what is obscene were crafted by earlier COUrts,64 the modern definition appears in Miller v. California. 6S
In Miller, the Court analyzed the application of California's
criminal obscenity statute66 to circumstances in which an individual
sent sexually explicit material to "unwilling recipients who had in
no way indicated any desire to receive such materials. "67 Miller conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult"
books. 68 Included in this mass mailing were five unsolicited
brochures sent through the mail to a restaurant in Newport News,
California. 69 The envelope was opened by the manager of the restaurant and his mother.70 Mter opening the unrequested envelope,
the manager and his mother complained to the police. 71 Mter a

64.

65.

66.

67.
68.

69.

70.
71.

States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-86 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942».
See Sergent, supra note 63, at 681 (stating that United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas.
1093 (C.C.S.D.N.V. 1879), adopted the obscenity test used in the English case
of Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R-Q.B. 360 (1868), which determined obscenity based
on the effect the material would have on the most susceptible members of the
population); Karo & McBrian, supra note 62, at 183-84 (explaining that early
American courts applied the English Hinklin test which was subsequently abandoned and replaced by the definition of obscenity articulated by the Supreme
Court in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957»; Edward John Main,
The Neglected Prong of the Miller Test Obscenity: Serious Literary, Artistic, Politica~ ur
Scientific Value, 11 S. Ill. U. LJ. 1159, 1159-60 (1987) (citing Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957». But
see Sergent, supra note 63, at 681-82 (explaining that other courts such as
United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930), United States v. One Book Entitled mysses, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934), and United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156
(2d Cir. 1936), adopted a test that required the material to be judged by the
dominant effect the allegedly obscene work would have on the average person
in the community).
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see also Karo & McBrian, supra note 62, at 184 ("The
Court found the Roth language entirely unsatisfactory in practice, however,
and replaced Roth II obscenity definition sixteen years later in Miller v. Califurnia.") (footnote omitted).
The appellant was convicted of the misdemeanor of knowingly distributing obscene material under California Penal Code § 311.2(a) & 311 (West
1968)(amended 1969). See Miller, 413 U.S. at 16.
Id. at 15.
See id. at 16. The brochures that the appellant mailed primarily consisted "of
pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting men and women in groups of
two or more engaging in a variety of sexual activities, with genitals often
prominently displayed." Id. at 18.
See id. at 18.
See id.
See id.
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jury trial, Miller was convicted of violating a statute that prohibited
knowingly distributing obscene materials.72 Prior to this decision,
the Court had never adopted a standard "to determiQe what constitutes obscene, or pornographic material subject to regulation under
the States' police power."73 As a result of this case, a majority of the
Court agreed on "concrete guidelines to isolate 'hard core' pornography from expression protected by the First Amendment. "74
The Court focused on three criteria, each of which must be fulfilled in order to deem a communication obscene. 7s Focusing on
the "average person applying contemporary community standards, "76 the Court first required the communication as a whole to
solely appeal to sexual interest. 77 The communication must also depict or describe sexual conduct, specifically addressed by the state
regulation, in a "patently offensive way. "78 The final consideration
requires a court to determine if the communication "lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. "79
The Miller Court affirmed the notion that states can pass laws
that prohibit circulating obscene material when the method of dispersal creates a "danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling
recipients or of exposure to juveniles. "80 The Court emphasized that
72. See id. at 16 n.1.
73. Id. at 22.
74. Id. at 29. Although the Court described the criteria as "guidelines," it is clear
that all three requirements must be fulfilled to render material "obscene" and
thereby devoid of constitutional protection. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct.
2329, 2332 (1997) (referring to the "three-prong obscenity test set forth in
Miller").
75. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
76. Id.
77. See id. (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972) (quoting Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957»). This requirement is often described
as "the prurient interest." See id.
78. Id. While the Court did not specifically define "patently offensive," it provided
two categories of materials satisfying this standard: "(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representation or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of genitals." Id. at 25.
79. Id. at 24.
80. Id. at 18-19; see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969) (noting that the
Roth decision rejected the need to prove that viewing obscene matter would
lead to unacceptable social conduct); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S.
676, 690 (1968) (indicating that a state may regulate the access of certain
materials to juveniles because of its strong interest in the deVelopment of children); Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 63743 (1968) (stating that a state's
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obscene material is not entitled to First Amendment protection. 81
Accordingly, the Miller Court developed standards for identifying
obscene material, thus allowing states to prohibit the dissemination
of material deemed "Miller obscene"82 without violating the First
Amendment. 83 What is Miller obscene to a child, however, is not
necessarily Miller obscene to an adult.
power to control the free flow of certain material to its children exceeds control over adults, and thus material not obscene to adults may still be found
obscene to children and subject to regulation); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S.
767, 769 (1967) (noting that the three cases consolidated in this action did
not involve obtrusive publication so as to make it "impossible for an unwilling
individual to avoid exposure" to the material in question); Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (recognizing that states have a legitimate interest in
stopping the free flow of harmful material to children); see also Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 317 (1972) (Burger, C. J., concurring) (observing that a
movie screen depicting sexual acts was visible to motorists passing by the theater and to minors watching the film from outside the fence surrounding the
theater; thus, the First Amendment would likely not prevent a state from regulating such displays); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 36~1 (1971)
(opinion of Marshall, J.) (noting that the government cannot exercise its
power to protect minors and unwilling recipients of sexual material until public or commercial distribution occurs because until then it is in private possession and threatens neither children nor anyone else); Breard v. Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622, 64445 (1951) (holding that an ordinance that prohibited the
sale of periodicals door-to-door at private residences, without the prior consent of the homeowner or occupants, did not abridge the First Amendment
because the community felt this sort of salesmanship was irritating to homeowners who did not desire subscriptions); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89
(1949) (validating an ordinance that protected local home and business owners from the use of sound trucks which emitted loud noises); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-70 (1944) (affirming the constitutionality of a state
statute forbidding distribution of religious material by a minor on the streets);
cJ. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 382-84 (1957) (noting that a state cannot
place a total ban on material which is not obscene to adults simply because it
is obscene to minors); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952)
(holding that motion pictures fall within First Amendment protections and
even if they possessed "a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the
youth of a community," it would not follow that they should be disqualified
from First Amendment protection); Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S.
451, 4~5 (1952) (stating that activities do not warrant any type of limitation
when such activities do not burden the general public's "convenience, comfort and safety").
81. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
82. See Michael I. Meyerson, Impending Legal Issues for Integrated Broadband Networlu,
3 U. FLA. J.L & PUB. POL'y 49, 55 n.29 (1990) ("Legal obscenity is frequently
referred to as 'Miller obscene. "').
83. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 20.
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3. A Lower Threshold of Obscenity Exists for Minors
In 1968, the Court reviewed Ginsberg v. New YorJtI4 to determine
the constitutionality of a New York criminal obscenity statute. 8S The
statute prohibited selling material to minors defined to be obscene
on the basis of its appeal to minors, whether or not it would be obscene to adults. 86 In upholding the constitutionality of the statute,
the Court rejected the defendant's broad argument that "the scope
of the constitutional freedom of expression secured to a citizen to
read or see material concerned with sex cannot be made to depend
on whether the citizen is an adult or a minor. "87
Ginsberg and his wife operated a stationary store and luncheonette in Long Island, New York. 88 Along with providing food services to customers, Ginsberg sold numerous magazines, including
some described as "girlie magazines. "89 On two separate occasions,
Ginsberg sold a sixteen-year-old boy a pornographic magazine90 and
was prosecuted pursuant to a New York statute. 91
By concluding that the statute did not invade the area of freedom of expression that the Constitution grants to minors,92 the
Court affirmed the state's authority to adjust the meaning of obscenity according to what appeals to the sexual interests of minors. 93
84. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
85. See id. at 621 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAw § 484-h (McKinney 1909) (current version
at N.Y. PENAL LAw § 235.21 (1967».
86. See ill. at 631.
87. [d. at 636. The defendant store owner insisted that denying section 484-h material to minors, insofar as that material is not obscene for persons 17 years of
age or older, constituted a violation of the First Amendment. See id.
88. See id. at 631.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See ill.
92. See id. at 637. For examples of statutes that did interfere with this right, see,
e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(holding a statute compelling children, against their religious beliefs, to salute
the American flag unconstitutional); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-36 (1925) (holding an Oregon statute that interfered with children's attendance at private and parochial schools unconstitutional); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (holding a Nebraska statute forbidding children to study modern languages other than English unconstitutional).
93. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638; see also Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509
(1966) (stating that the prurient-appeal requirement will be adjusted to "social
realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed in
terms of the sexual interests of its intended and probable recipient group");
Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668,671 (N.Y. 1966) (holding that the
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Therefore, "even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms
'the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches
beyond' the scope of its authority over adults."'94 The Court justified
this regulatory paternalism over minors on the grounds that each
state "has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth,"9S
and that parents are not always capable of controlling what their
own children read. 96
The Ginsburg opinion signaled the Court's acceptance of the
"variable obscenity approach."97 This approach recognizes the legitimate interests states have in fashioning statutes that create a lower
threshold of obscenity for younger audiences. 98 Even though states
are permitted to redefine obscenity for minors, courts must continue to analyze the constitutionality of these statutes with limiting
principles in mind. These limiting principles are overbreadth and
vagueness. 99
In particular, the concept of overbreadth prevents the government from denying the general public access to materials simply because they could be inappropriate for minors. loo The Court has explained that to restrict the general population to that which is
appropriate for children, would be "'to bum the house to roast the
pig. "'101 This concern creates unique considerations for the Court
when it reviews cases dealing with methods of speech outside of the
traditional realm of print media.

94.

95.
96.

97.
98.

99.
100.
101.

definition of obscenity may depend solely upon to whom the material in question is directed).
Ginsberg, 390 V.S. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 V.S. 158, 170
(1944». In Prince, the Court upheld the conviction of the guardian of a nineyear-old girl for violating the Massachusetts child labor law by permitting the
girl to sell religious tracts for the Jehovah's Witnesses on the streets of Boston.
See id. at 638-39.
Id. at 640.
See id. (quoting People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334 (N.Y. 1965) (Fuld, J.,
concurring) which struck down the first version of § 484-h of the New York
Penal Law on grounds of vagueness).
See JOHN E. NOWAK &: RONALD D. ROTUNDA. TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw,
§ 16.61 (b), at 1205 (2d ed. 1992).
See Kevin W. Saunders, Elo:tTonic Indecency: Protecting Childnm in the Wake of the
Cable and Internet Cases, 46 DRAKE L REv. 1, 34 (1997) ("Variable obscenity allows consideration of the audience in determining whether material is obscene and prohibiting the distribution of obscene material to that particular
audience. ") .
See NOWAK &: ROTUNDA, supra note 97, § 16.61(b), at 1205.
See ill.
Id. § 16.61 (b), at 1206 (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 V.S. 380,383 (1957».
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4. Indecent Broadcasting Can Be Prohibited
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. I02 The Court reviewed the constitutionality of a declaratory order issued by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) 103 pursuant to its congressionally authorized
power to regulate indecent public broadcasting under 18 U.S.C. §
1464. 104 Section 1464 forbade the use of "any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communications."I05 The Court
explained that "of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting
that has received the most limited First Amendment protection"l06
and ultimately concluded that the FCC could prohibit indecent
broadcasting. 107
Pacifica involved the broadcast of comedian George Carlin's infamous monologue entitled "Filthy Words."I08 The New York radio
station owned by Pacifica Foundation played the monologue one afternoon at about 2:00 p.m. loo A man who heard the broadcast while
driving with his son complained to the FCC that this type of monologue should not have been broadcast on the public airwaves. llo
The FCC issued a declaratory order stating that if any more complaints about the broadcast were filed, it would decide whether to
impose sanctions against the station for airing it. 1\1
The Pacifica Court explained that governmental acts which regulate the content of speech are not automatically violative of the
First Amendment. 112 The First Amendment analysis of speech regu102. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
103. Created by the Communications Act of 1934, the FCC regulates interstate and
foreign communications by wire and radio in the public interest. See BLACK'S
LAw DIGnONARY 610 (6th ed. 1990). The regulatory power of the FCC includes
radio and television broadcasting, telephone, telegraph, cable television operation, two-way radio and radio operators, and satellite communication. See id.
104. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 729.
109. See id. at 729-30.
110. See id. at 730.
Ill. See id. The Commission did not impose formal sanctions, but it did state that
the order would be "associated with the station's license file, and in the event
that subsequent complaints are received, the Commission will then decide
whether it should utilize any of the available sanctions it has been granted by
Congress." Id.
112. See id. at 744.
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lations requires a court to examine both the content and context in
which the speech occurred.113 The Court found that because the
content of Pacifica s broadcast was vulgar, offensive, and shocking, it
was not entitled to absolute First Amendment protection in all situations.114 Of more noteworthy significance, however, was the Court's
review of the context in which the monologue was communicated
to others. lIS
The Court primarily based its context analysis of broadcast media on two characteristics that distinguish it from other forms of
communication}16 First, broadcast media permeate the privacy of
homes, "where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder."ll7 The second
113. See id. The Court quotes this analysis as first articulated by Mr. Justice Holmes
in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919):
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants
in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within
their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends
upon the circumstances in which it is done .... The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting
fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man
from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect
of force . . . . The question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevenL
Id. at 52.
114. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747.
115. See id. at 747-48. The importance of context is illustrated by Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). In Cohen, Paul Cohen entered a Los Angeles courthouse wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." See ill. at 16. After
entering the courtroom, he took the jacket off and folded it. See ill. at 19 n.3.
The evidence showed no violent reaction to the jacket by anyone in the courtroom. See id. at 16. Nonetheless, when he left the courtroom, Cohen was arrested, convicted of disturbing the peace, and sentenced to 30 days in prison.
See id. The Court held that criminal sanctions could not be imposed on Gohen for his political statement in a public place because there was no evidence showing his "speech" offended unwilling viewers, especially since no
one objected to it. See ill. at 22.
116. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
117. Id. (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970». The Court
stated:
Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior
warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content. To say that one may avoid further offense
by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow.
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characteristic is the accessibility of the broadcasts to children. l1s
This accessibility arid the previously legitimized Ginsberg paternalism
justified upholding the FCC's order. 119 While no Court has expressly
held, commentators have observed that opinions such as Pacifica
represent an attempt to create a middle tier of constitutional protection for offensive, but non-obscene speech when the context is
broadcast media. 12o Another mode of communicating indecent
speech that has been the subject of regulatory restrictions is the
dial-a-porn industry.

One may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does
not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that
has already taken place.
[d. at 74849.
118. See id. at 749.
119. See id. at 750. However, the Court noted:
It is appropriate, in conclusion, to emphasize the narrowness of our
holding. This case does not involve a two-way radio conversation be-tween a cab driver and a dispatcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan
comedy. We have not decided that an occasional expletive in either
setting would justify any sanction or, indeed, that this broadcast
would justify a criminal prosecution. The Commission's decision
rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is allimportant. The concept requires consideration of a host of variables.
The time of day was emphasized by the Commission. The content of
the program in which the language is used will also affect the composition of the audience, and differences between radio, television,
and perhaps closed-circuit transmissions, may also be relevant.
[d. Commentators have called into question the legitimacy of the FCC's interest in preventing this type of inadvertent exposure to children. See TRIBE, supra
note 38, § 1218, at 937. Laurence Tribe reasons that the likelihood that children would be exposed to the particular program was minimal because most
children would be at school at the time the program aired and the station catered to a distinct adult audience. See id.; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 97, § 16.18(a), at 1033 ("The Court did not explain why it did not assume that children old enough to understand the Carlin monologue were
more likely to be in school in the early afternoon."). Outside of the Court's
two justifications for according broadcasting the most limited First Amendment protection of all other media, a majority of Justices "could not agree on
the constitutional rationale for their holding." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
97, § 16.18(a), at 1034.
120. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 38, § 12-18, at 938 ("Although the COurt has clearly
embarked on the task of erecting a hierarchy of expression within the First
Amendment, it is important to note that no Court has yet squarely held that
offensive or sexually explicit but non-obscene speech enjoys less than full First
Amendment protection.").
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5. Indecent Dial-A-Pom Can be Regulated, but not Banned
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided the most analogous case
to Reno--Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC. 121 Sable Communications began providing sexually explicit, pre-recorded telephone messages through Pacific Bell. 122 Sable sought declaratory
and injunctive relief against enforcement of section 223(b) of the
Communications Act l23 which banned all indecent and obscene interstate "dial-a-porn" telephone messages. 124 In affirming the district
court,l25 the Supreme Court held that the statute was not narrowly
tailored to only protect children from exposure to indecent
messages. 126 Although acknowledging that "[s]exual expression
which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment, "127 the Court concluded that the government may regulate
the content of indecent speech to serve a compelling interest. 128
121. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
122. See id. at 117-18. Sable Communications charged a fee to people who accessed
the messages, which Pacific Bell collected and divided between itself and Sable
Communications. See id. at 118.
123. See id. The Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of section 223(b) of
the Communications Act of 1934. See id.; 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a) (1)(A) (1982 &
Supp. V 1988). The company based its challenge on the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 117-18. Sable Communications wanted to
enjoin the FCC and the Department of Justice from pursuing "any criminal
investigation or prosecution, civil action or administrative proceeding under
the statute. n Id. at 117.
124. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 117.
125. :rhe district court struck down the "indecent speech" provision of 47 U.S.C. §
223(b), holding that the statute was overbroad and unconstitutional. See id. at
118-19. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's ruling on the constitutionality of section 223(a) (1 )(A) 's prohibition on obscene messages, stating
that the Court has "repeatedly held that the protection of the First Amendment does not extend to obscene speech." Id. at 124; see, e.g., Paris Adult The.ater v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (holding that First Amendment protection does not extend to obscene speech).
126. See Sabk, 492 U.S. at 126. In support of the district court's decision, the Court
stated that Sabk, "like Butler, presents ... 'legislation not reasonably restricted
to the evil with which it is said to deaL'" Id. at 127 (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957». The Butler Court further held that a statute which
made it an offense to make available to the general public material found to
have a potentially harmful influence on minors was' insufficiently tailored
since it denied adults their free speech rights by allowing them to read only
what was acceptable for children. See Butler, 352 U,S. at 383.
127. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
128. See id. The Court observed that to survive constitutional scrutiny, any regulation promulgated to serve such an interest must be narrowly drafted so as to
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The Court obseIVed that protecting the physical and psychological
well-being of minors from certain sexual material is a compelling interest. 129 However, the Court concluded that the total ban on indecent messages was unconstitutional'30 because less restrictive means
were available to seIVe the government's interest without denying
adults access to constitutionally protected messages. 131 The Court
suggested that potential alternates included "credit card, access
code, and scrambling rules [as] a satisfactory solution to the problem of keeping indecent dial-a-porn messages out of the reach of
minors. "132 These alternative means of shielding children from inaIT
propriate communications were a focal point of the Reno decision.
Prior to discussing screening methods for the Internet, however, it
is necessary to define what the Internet actually encompasses and
how it developed up to the Court's decision in Reno.
B. History of the Internet

The Internet originated in 1969 as the result of an experimental project of the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA), and
was called ARPANET.133 Originally, the United States Government
used ARPANET to link computers conducting defense-related research.134 The network soon evolved from its defense-related re-

129.
130.

131.

132.
133.
134.

not unnecessarily interfere with the First Amendment right to exercise free
speech. See itt. Specifically, the Court stated that "the Government may serve
this legitimate interest, but to withstand constitutional scrutiny, 'it must do so
by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms.~ Id. (quoting Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620,637 (1980), which is based on
the Court's holding in Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976)
and First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978».
See itt. This least restrictive means analysis, while not dispositive in Reno, certainly plays a part in deciding how best to regulate the Internet.
See id. at 131. It is worthy to note the similarity between § 223(b) and the
CDA provisions at issue in Reno. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 828-29
(1996) (explaining that CDA provisions at issue regulate indecent, obscene,
and "patently offensive" communication employing a telecommunications device or an interactive computer service). Section 223(b) was introduced on
the floor of Congress and no Congressman or Senator presented data with respect to how often or to what extent minors could avoid any regulations and
access dial-a-porn messages. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 130.
See itt. at 128. As the Court explained, 42 U.S.C. § 223(b), "as amended in
1988, impose[d] an outright ban on indecent as well as obscene interstate
commercial telephone messages." Id. at 117.
Id. at 128.
See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
See id.
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search ongms to serve universities, corporations, and individuals
around the world. 13S Following this expansive evolution, the
ARPANET became known as the "DARPA Internet" and later simply
the "Internet. "136
It is nearly impossible to determine the size of the Internet because no single entity administers it.137 However, reports show "that
the Internet has experienced extraordinary growth in recent
years."138 As of 1996, approximately 9,400,000 host computers were
estimated to be . linked to the Internet, with sixty percent of these
host comput.ers located in the United States}39 This estimate does
not include the personal computers used to access the Internet,
which brings the number of Internet users to as many as forty million worldwide. l40 The total number of computer users who access
the Internet was expected to reach 200 million by the year 1999}41
Several methods of communicating information are available
once a person gains access to the Internet. 142 These methods are as
follows: (1) one-to-one messaging, such as electronic mail (e-mail),
which allows· direct communications to another individual comparable to sending a first class letter; (2) one-to-many messaging, such as
listservs or mail exploders, which allows individuals interested in a
particular subject to join a mailing list and communicate their
messages to all other members of the mailing list simultaneously,
analogous to a bulk mailer; (3) distributed message databases, such
as newsgroups, which are similar to listservs inasmuch as they relate
to particular areas of interest, but unlike a listserv, users simply access the database when they desire to communicate with others
about the subject matter; (4) real time communication, such as chat
rooms, which allow two or more people to type messages to each
other that almost immediately appear on the others' computer
screens; and (5) remote information retrieval, such as the World
Wide Web, which provides a global platform of online information
that users access through search engines. 143 The World Wide Web
approach to information retrieval is the most advance information
See ill.
See id.
See id. at 831-32.

135.
136.
137.
138.

[d. at 831.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id. at 834.
id.
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retrieval system and is "fast becoming the most well-known on the
Internet. "144 For the most part, in each of the methods described
above, users can transmit and receive text, audio, and visual
images. 14S The ease of accessing sexually explicit material through
anyone of the information retrieval methods is a major concern,
particularly in light of the explosive growth of the World Wide Web.
This problem arises because once someone posts sexually explicit
material on the World Wide Web, the individual posting the material is unable to prevent it from entering any specific community}46
Thus, the Internet can be viewed as a network of networks-meaning any information contained on a network connected to the Internet has the capacity to be retrieved by any other linked
network. 147
Unlike radio broadcasts and television, sexually explicit communications over the Internet are much less likely to enter a person's
home inadvertently.l48 Receiving information on the Internet requires one to take "a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and
directed than merely turning a dial. "149 Furthermore, almost all sexually explicit materials "are preceded by warnings as to the contenL "ISO One government witness testified, at an evidentiary hearing
in Reno that "the 'odds are slim' that a user would come across a
sexually explicit site by accident." lSI
Individuals and commercial entities that communicate through
the Internet have faced difficulties in setting boundaries on the accessibility of materials they make available to users. Several attempts
have been made to develop methods of verifying the age of Internet
users who access material through the various informational retrieval methods. IS2 However, when the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided Reno, it believed
there were no reliable means by which to screen the age of Internet
users accessing information through any informational retrieval
method, nor could anything be done to segregate Internet fora containing sexual material into "'adult' or 'moderated' areas of cyber144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

[d. at 836.
See ill. at 834.
See it! at 844.
See it!
See it!
[d. at 845.
[d. at 844.
[d. at 844-45.
See it! at 84549.
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space. "153 The expansiveness of the Internet and the fact that it was
unregulated led Congress to enact the Communications Decency
Act of 1996.
C. History of the CDA
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 1S4 was an extremely broad
piece of legislation promulgated by Congress. The purpose of the
Act was "[t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order
to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of
new telecommunications technologies."ISS The Act included seven titles, but the major provisions had nothing to do with the
Internet. 156
Six of the titles were the result of "extensive committee hearings and the subject of discussion in Reports prepared by Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives. "157 However,
Title V, the CDA, contained provisions added either after the hearings were completed or as amendments during floor debates. ls8
Congress failed to thoroughly analyze the CDA and its potential effect on the Internet, and the result was a hastily drafted piece of
legislation. ls9 The two statutory provisions challenged in Reno were
offered on the floor of the Senate and each provision received an
informal label. l60 Section 223(a), which prohibited knowingly transmitting obscene or indecent communications to minors, was labeled
the "indecent transmission" provision. Section 223(d), which prohibited knowingly sending or displaying sexually explicit messages
that were patently offensive to minors, was labeled the "patently offensive display" provision. 161
In order to curtail the reach of these two provisions, Congress
enacted section 223 (e)( 5) .162 This provision provided two affirmative
defenses for potential violators seeking to escape the reach of sections 223(a) and 223(d).163 One defense pertained to a person who
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

161.
162.
163.

Id. at 845.
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
Id.
See itl.
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2338 (1997).
See id.
See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2338.
See id.
See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5) (Supp. 1998).
See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2339.
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had taken "'good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions' to restrict access by minors to the prohibited communications. "164 The second defense provided protection for "those who
restrict access to covered material by requiring certain designated
fonns of age proof, such as a verified credit card or an adult identification number or code. "165 Thus, Congress drafted what it believed
to be a narrowly tailored law which provided sufficient defenses to
prosecution in light of the Court's prior admonitions in Sable. l66
Reno provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity to consider
the constitutionality of the CDA and its affinnative defenses, while
defining its stance on Internet regulation. Prior to Reno, the Court
dealt with legislative subject matter that included areas with extensive histories of governmental regulation. 167 However, the Internet
did not have this type of regulatory history and the CDA was the
first attempt to regulate this medium of communication. l68 With the
ever-increasing amount of Internet use in this country and the increasing awareness of the Internet's communicative capabilities,
Reno presented a ripe situation for the Supreme Court to express its
opinion about Internet regulation. l69
III. INSTANT CASE
President Clinton signed the CDA on February 8, 1996. 170 On
the same day, twenty plaintiffs, led by the ACLU, filed an action in
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. (quoting 47 U.S.CA § 223(e)(5)(A) (1997».
Id. (citing 47 U.S.CA § 223(e)(5)(B) (1997».
See ilL For a discussion of Sable, see supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343 ("Thus, some of our cases have recognized special
justifications for regulation of the broadcast media that are not applicable to
other speakers.")(citations omitted); see also FCC v. League of Women Voters
of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984) (holding that the constitutionality of broadcast regulations does not require that such regulations serve "compelling" government interests since broadcast regulation "involves unique considerations"); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (holding that "of
all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection" and the reasons for treating broadcasting
differently are: (1) broadcasts reach people in the privacy of their own homes
without prior warning and (2) broadcasts are available to children of all ages);
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (noting that the characteristics of new media warrant different First Amendment analysis); NBC v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190,215 (1943) (upholding the FCC's authority to regulate radio communications beyond the engineering and technical aspects).
168. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343.
169. See infra notes 170-270 and accompanying text.
170. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2339.
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the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and moved for a temporary restraining order to enjoin enforcement of sections 223(a) and 223(d) of the CDA.17I The case
was assigned to Judge Ronald Buckwalter, and he proceeded to conduct an evidentiary hearing on February 15, 1996.172 Judge
Buckwalter granted a limited temporary restraining order after finding that section 223(a)(1)(B) was unconstitutionally vague. 173 As a
result of this order, the CDA was not enforceable against any potential violators.174 When twenty-seven other plaintiffs filed the same
constitutional challenge to the CDA, a threejudge court convened
and consolidated the two cases. 175
The parties stipulated to many of the facts involved and placed
an extensive portion of their cases before the court by sworn declarations at the consolidated hearings. 176 The plaintiffs targeted their
constitutional challenge on section 223(a)(I)(B) and section
223(d) (1) of the CDA.I'7 However, the plaintiffs made it clear that
they did "not quarrel with the statute to the extent that it covers
obscenity or child pornography, which were already proscribed
before the CDA's adoption. "178
The district court held that sections 223(a)(1)(B) and
223(d)(l) were unconstitutional on their face under First Amendment overbreadth and Fifth Amendment vagueness doctrines.179
Therefore, the judgment of the district court enjoined the Government from enforcing the "indecent" material prohibition in section
223(a)(1 )(B), but "preserve[d] the Government's right to investi171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

176.
177.

178.
179.

SeeACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
See id. at 827.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 827-28 & n.3. The plaintiffs in the first suit requested Chief judge
Dolores Sloviter of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to
appoint a three-judge court pursuant to section 561 (a) of the Communications Decency Act. See id. at 827. As is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2284, judge
Sloviter appointed such a court consisting of herself, judge Buckwalter, and
judge Stewart Dalzell. See id. Soon after these events, the American Library A!r
sociation, Inc. and an additional 26 plaintiffs filed a similar lawsuit against the
Government. See ill. at 827-28 & n.3. On February 27, 1996, Chief judge
Sloviter convened the same threejudge court and consolidated the two actions pursuant to FED. R CIV. P. 42(a). See id. at 828; see also supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 828.
See id. at 829.
[d.
See id. at 849.
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gate and prosecute the obscenity or child pornography activities
prohibited therein. The injunction against enforcement of sections
223(d)(l) and (2) [was] unqualified because those provisions contain[ed] no separate reference to obscenity or child pornography. "180 Although the district court's judgment was unanimous, each
judge wrote a separate opinion. 181
The Government appealed the order of the district court directly to the United States Supreme Court pursuant to section
561 (b) of the CDA. 182 This provision mandated that, upon request,
parties could appeal directly to the Supreme Court with a facial
constitutional challenge to the CDA.183 Mter reviewing the provisions of the statute and the opposing arguments presented by the
parties, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision on
First Amendment grounds without deciding whether the provisions
violated the Fifth Amendment. l84
The Court reviewed past decisions upon which the Government
relied, analyzed the overbreadth of the CDA provisions at issue, and
finally considered the Government's additional arguments concerning affirmative defenses and the Act's severability clause. 18S The
Court found the Government's reliance on past regulatory cases
misplaced and the language of the CDA's provisions overbroad. l86 In
striking down the challenged provisions, the Court relied on its
time-honored tradition of protecting free speech under the First
Amendment when a statute is not narrowly tailored to support a legitimate government interest. 187
A. Supreme Court Distinguishes Reno from Prior Cases

In Reno, the Government argued that the CDA was constitutionally permissible under three of the Supreme Court's earlier cases. l88
These cases were Ginsberg v. New yom, 189 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 190
180. Id.

181. See ilL at 857-83.
182. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 234041.
183. See 47 U.S.C. § 561(b) (1997).
184. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
185. See infra notes 188-270 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 188-270 and accompanying text.
187. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
188. See ilL at 2341.
189. For a discussion of the Reno Court's distinguishment of Ginsberg v. New York. see
infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
190. For a discussion of the Reno Court's distinguishment of FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
see infra notes 202-10 and accompanying text.
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and Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. 191 Instead of providing support
for the Government's position, the Court observed that these cases
created serious doubt about the constitutionality of the CDA's
provisions. 192

1. Ginsberg Distinguished from Reno
In Ginsberg, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New
York statute that prohibited selling certain types of obscene material
to minors. 193 The Reno Court reasoned that the statute in Ginsberg
was narrower than the CDA in four different respects. l94 First, the
Ginsberg statute did not prevent parents who wished to purchase the
magazines for their children to do so, unlike the CDA, which would
be applicable even if parents consented to their children receiving
the material or supervised their children in obtaining the material. 19S Second, the statute in Ginsberg applied only to commercial
sales, unlike the CDA which contained no such limitation. l96 Third,
the Ginsberg statute specifically defined the harmful material sought
to be suppressed as "utterly without redeeming social importance
for minors."I97 The CDA, on the other hand, failed to provide any
definition of "indecent," which was employed in section
223 (a) (1).198 In addition, the "patently offensive" standard used in
section 223(d) failed to provide that such material must lack serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in order to fall within
the statute. l99 Lastly, the Court npted that the New York statute defined a minor as any person under the age of seventeen, but the
CDA applied to persons under the age of eighteen,200 thereby increasing itsreach. 201 For these reasons, the Court rejected the Gov191. For a discussion of the Reno Court's distinguishment of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., see also infra notes 211-21 and accompanying text.
192. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
193. See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
194. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
195. See id. ("Under the CDA, by contrast, neither the parents' consent-nor even
their participation-in the communication would avoid the application of the
statute. ").
196. See id. The Ginsberg statute applied only to situations where merchants sold
magazines containing indecent materials to minors. See Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 647 (1968).
197. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 646
(1968».
198. See id. at 2341.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. By attempting to protect people 18 and under, the CDA in effect expands its
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ernment's contention that the CDA was of a similar restrictive nature to the Ginsberg statute.
2. Pacifica Distinguished from Reno

Thereafter, the Court compared its Pacifica decision with the
instant case because of the Government's argument that Pacifica applied to the analysis of the CDA. 202 In Pacifica, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a declaratory order administered by the FCC
against a radio station that broadcast a certain comedic monologue. 203 Again, the Court drew several distinctions between the
Pacifica order and the CDA. 204
First, the order in Pacifica applied to one specific broadcast,lOS
unlike the CDA's prohibitions which were "not limited to particular
times and [were] not dependent on any evaluation by an agency familiar with the unique characteristics of the Internet. "206 Second,
the FCC's order was not punitive in any way, unlike the CDA which
imposed criminal sanctions on violators. 207 Lastly, the Pacifica order
applied to radio broadcasts governed by the FCC, which historically
"received the most limited First Amendment protection"208 because
warnings could not protect listeners from offensive program content. 209 In contrast, the Internet was not subject to any regulatory
agency's evaluations concerning material transmitted through it.210
3. Renton Distinguished from Reno

Lastly, the Supreme Court distinguished the instant case from
its decision in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 211 The zoning ordinance upheld in Renton had several distinguishing features from the
coverage to a whole other segment of society that many see as adult. See id. at
2346.
202. See ill. at 2341, 2343.
203. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
204. See infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
205. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342 ("[T]he order in Pacifica, issued by an agency that
had been regulating radio stations for decades, targeted a specific broadcast
that represented a rather dramatic departure from traditional program content in order to designate when-rather than whether-it would be permissible to air such a program in that particular medium.").
206. [do
207. See ill.
208. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 728 (1978).
209. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342.
210. See id.

211. 475 U.S. 41 (1986); see also infra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
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COA.212 The Renton ordinance focused on minimizing the deleterious secondary effects that adult movie theaters have on residential
neighborhoods. 213 The COA did not focus on any secondary effects
that indecent or patently offensive material might have on children,
but "applie[d] broadly to the entire universe of cyberspace."214
Therefore, the Court reasoned that "the COA [was] a content-based
blanket restriction on speech, and, as such, [could not] be 'properly analyZed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation, "'21S
which was the analysis employed by the Court in Rentlm.
B. Broadcast Media Distinguished from Internet

To further distinguish its past justifications for subjecting the
broadcast media to harsh regulation, the Court noted several differences between broadcast media and the Internet. 216 These differences include the long history of governmental regulation" of broadcast media,217 the lack of available frequencies for broadcasters,218
212. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 234243.
213. See id. at 2342 ("The [Renton] ordinance was aimed, not at the content of the
films shown in the theaters, but rather at the 'secondary effects'--such as
crime and deteriorating property values--that these theaters fostered .... ")
214. Id.
215. Id. (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 46). In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622 (1994), the Court stated that "[a]s a general rule, laws that by
their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of
the ideas or views expressed are content based. By contrast, laws that confer
benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views
expressed are in most instances content-neutral." Id. at 643 (citations omitted).
216. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343.
217. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (holding" that the
history of the fairness doctrine and of related legislation demonstrates that
the FCC's action did not exceed its authority, that in adopting the new regulations, the FCC was implementing Congressional policy, and that the fairness
doctrine and its specific manifestations in the personal attack and political editorial rules do not violate the First Amendment).
218. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 637 (holding that the appropriate standard by which to
evaluate the constitutionality of the must-carry provision is the intermediate
level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)
(holding that a content-neutral regulation will be sustained "if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest").
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and the intrusive nature of broadcasting. 219 The Court concluded
that none of these factors were present in cyberspace and deferred
to several of the district court's findings concerning the near impossibility of a situation in which an Internet user would access sexually
explicit material accidentally or unwillingly.220 Accordingly, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that prior
Supreme Court case law failed to provide a compelling basis to subject the Internet to the watered-down level of First Amendment
scrutiny that broadcast media endure. 221 The Court then turned to
the affirmative precedent that required it to strike down the CDA.
C. Vagueness and the Miller Test
The Court did not analyze the CDA under the Fifth Amendment because it struck down the provisions on First Amendment
vagueness grounds. 222 Neither "indecent" nor "patently offensive"
was defined by the statute and the Court opined that these terms
would "provoke uncertainty among speakers about how the two
standards relate to each other and just what they mean. "223 As a result of this vagueness, the CDA was in fact a blanket content-based
regulation of speech and would have a considerable chilling effect
on free speech. 224 Furthermore, the CDA threatened potential viola219. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,128 (1989). In Sable, the Court distinguished radio from telephone dial-a-porn:
There is no "captive audience" problem here; callers will generally
not be unwilling listeners. The context of dial-in services, where a
caller seeks and is willing to pay for the communication, is manifestly
different from a situation in which a listener does not want the received message. Placing a telephone call is not the same as turning
on a radio and being taken by surprise by an indecent message. Unlike an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the message received by one who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding
exposure to it.
220. Id. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343.
221. See id. at 2344.
222. See id.
223. Id. (footnote omitted).
224. See id.; see also Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-51 (1991)
(holding that Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177, that prohibited a lawyer from
making extrajudicial statements to the press that have a substantial likelihood
of materially prejudicing an adjudication proceeding, was void for vagueness
because the rule failed to provide fair notice to those at whom it was directed
and was so imprecise grammatically that discriminatory enforcement was a
real possibility).
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tors with criminal sanctions. 22S The Court reasoned that the uncertainty of what material the statute covered, coupled with the threat
of prosecution may deter people from communicating with one another through words or ideas that mayor may not be unlawful. 226
The Government's response to this vagueness finding was that
the statute was no more vague than the three-prong obscenity standard created by the Court in Miller v. Californit/,.227 The Government
reasoned that q-te "patently offensive" standard of the CDA was included in the second prong of the widely accepted Miller obscenity
test; therefore, according to the Government, the resulting conclusion must be that the COA was constitutionally defensible. 228 The
Supreme Court found the Government's reasoning 'flawed in several
respects. 229
All three prongs of the Miller test work together to limit the
reach of the obscenity standard. 230 Thus, it would be incorrect to
evaluate one prong without considering the others. The COA
lacked any limiting language and created a greater danger of suppressing speech that would otherwise lie beyond the reach of the
Miller standard. 231 When a statutory regulation affects constitutionally protected speech in an adverse manner, the Government must
demonstrate that the regulation promotes a compelling interest and
that the least restrictive means of furthering such interests are
employed.232
The Supreme Court concluded that in order for the COA to
meet its intended purpose of denying minors access to sexually ex225. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344-45.
226. See id. at 2345.
227. See ill. (discussing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973». In Miller, the
Court reaffirmed Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), holding that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment. See Miller, 413 U.S. at
36.
228. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2345.
229. See id. The Court concluded that the Government was incorrect because the
second prong of the Miller test limited its reach to certain material "'specifically defined by the applicable state law. '" Id. The CDA has no such requirement, which would have the effect of reducing the vagueness of "patently offensive." Id. Furthermore, the Miller test is limited to "sexual conduct," while
the CDA extends to "'excretory activities' as well as 'organs' of both a sexual
and excretory nature." Id.
230. See ill. ("Just because a definition including three limitations is not vague, it
does not follow that one of those limitations, standing by itself, is not
vague.").
231. See ill. at 2346.
232. See Sable Communications of Cal, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
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plicit material, it must suppress a plethora of speech "that adults
have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another. "233 In prior cases, the Court consistently held that speech
which was indecent but not obscene was entitled to protection
under the First Amendment as to the adult population.234 Protecting
children from harmful materials is a valid governmental interest
which has received repeated recognition by the Court. 23S However,
the interest in protecting minors never justifies "an unnecessarily
broad suppression of speech addressed to adults. "236 Thus, the
Court agreed with the district court that the CDA was analogous to
the dial-a-pom ban in Sable.237
In Sable, the FCC argued that the Court "should defer to Congress' conclusion about an issue of constitutional law. "238 The Court
responded that "it is [the Court's] task in the end to decide
whether Congress has violated the Constitution "239 and rejected the
notion "that nothing less than a total ban would be effective in
preventing enterprising youngsters from gaining access to indecent
communications."240 As a result, the Sable Court declared that a constitutional inquiry does not end merely because a statute serves a Ie-

233. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
234. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
701 (1977) ("[W]here obscenity is not involved, [the Court has] consistently
held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not
justify its suppression.").
235. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (noting that certain businesses, such as movie theaters and book stores, may be prohibited from giving
children access to indecent material); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639
(1968) (upholding a state statute that limited the availability of sexual material
to minors because such material Was deemed to be harmful to the development of minors).
236. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346. "[T]he Government may not 'reduc[e] the adult population ... to ... only what is fit for children.'" Id. (quoting Denver Area
Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2393 (1996)
(quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128
(1989»). "[R] egardless of the strength of the government's interest' in protecting children, '[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be
limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox.'" Id. (quoting Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983».
237. See id.
238. Sable, 492 U.S. at 129.
239. Id.; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (holding that it is the
responsibility of the judiciary to interpret the law).
240. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
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gitimate government interest. 241 The purpose of the statute must be
served through the least restrictive means possible for it to survive
constitutional scrutiny.242
The Supreme Court distinguished the CDA from the statutes in
Ginsberg and Pacifica because the least restrictive means of attaining
the goal of the CDA were not used. 243 The Ginsberg and Pacifica statutes were tailored to meet their purposes in the least restrictive
manner possible, whereas the CDA was not limited in any similar
way. 244 As written, the CDA would prohibit access to
"nonpornographic material with serious educational or other
value"24s and would subject parents to a prison sentence for allowing their children to access information on the Internet that the
parents deem appropriate. 246 Therefore, the CDA was a contentbased restriction on speech, and the Government had the burden
of showing "why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective
as the CDA. "247
The Government could not prove that there were effective
means, at a reasonably affordable price, for non-commercial speak241. See ill. ("[T]he mere fact that a statutory regulation of speech was enacted for
the important purpose of protecting children from exposure to sexually explicit material does not foreclose inquiry into its validity.") (footnote omitted).
242. "As we pointed out last Term, that inquiry embodies an 'over-arching commitment' to make sure that Congress has designed its statute to accomplish its
purpose 'without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech.'" Id.
at 234647 (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
116 S. Ct. 2374, 2385 (1996) (holding that a statutory provision permitting a
cable operator to prohibit patently offensive or indecent programming on
leased access channels is consistent with the First Amendment, a "segregate
and block" provision with respect to the leased access channels violates the
First Amendment, and a provision permitting the operator to prohibit patently offensive or indecent programming on public access channels violates
the First Amendment».
243. See ill. ("Unlike the regulations upheld in Ginsberg and Pacifica, the scope of
the CDA is not limited to commercial speech or commercial entities. Its openended prohibitions embrace all non-profit entities and individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them on their own computers in the presence
of minors.").
244. See ill.
245. Id.
246. See ill. at 2348 ("Similarly, a parent who sent his 17-year-old college freshman
information on birth control via e-mail could be incarcerated even though
neither he, his child, nor anyone in their home community, found the material 'indecent' or 'patently offensive,' if the college town's community thought
otherwise. ").
247. Id.
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ers to screen minors from "accessing material through e-mail.mail
exploders, newsgroups, or chat rooms. "248 Therefore, a great deal of
adult communication on the Internet was hindered because of the
all-encompass.ing language of the CDA.249 The Government simply
failed to meet its burden and as a result the CDA, as written, was
facially overbroad under the First Amendment.2S0
The Government set forth several additional arguments in support of the constitutionality of the CDA, which were dismissed by
the Court.25I In addition to these rejected arguments, the Government suggested that the affirmative defenses provided in section
223(e) (5)252 curtailed the statute's unconstitutional reach.2S3 How248. Id. at 2347 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996».
249. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2347.- "These limitations must inevitably curtail a significant amount of adult communication on the Internet." Iff.. "The breadth of
the CDA's coverage is wholly unprecedented." Iff..
250. See ilL
251. See ilL at 234849. These arguments included: (1) that the CDA was constitutional because it leaves open ample alternative channels of communication;
(2) that the plain meaning of the Act's "knowledge" and "specific person" requirement restricts its applications; and (3) the Act's prohibitions are almost
always limited to material lacking social value. See ilL at 2349.
252. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5) (Supp. 1998). Section 223(e)(5) provided:
(a) Defenses-In addition to any other defenses available by law... (5) It is
a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(I)(B) or (d) of this section, or under subsection (a) (2) of this section with respect to the use of
a facility for an activity under subsection (a)(I)(B) of this section that a
person-(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication specified in such subsections, which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such
communications, including any method which is feasible under available
technology; or has restricted access to such communication by requiring
use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult
personal identification number.
Id. Finally, the Government argued that the CDA helps to encourage the
growth of the Internet because people who refuse to subscribe to the Internet
due to the pornographic material available to children would no longer have
to worry about such a problem. Thus, the Government reasoned that this argument "provides an independent basis for upholding the constitutionality of
the CDA." Reno, 177 S.Ct. at 2351. However, the Court considered this argument the Government's weakest because it contradicted the district court's factual findings. See id. These findings indicated the recent, expansive growth of
the Internet occurred regardless of the availability of sexual material on the
Internet. See id. "The Government apparently assumes that the unregulated
availability of 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' material on the Internet is
driving countless citizens away from the medium because of the risk of expos-
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ever, the Court concluded that the Government's suggestion of
"tagging" sexually explicit transmissions per section 223(e)(5)(A)
would be ineffective, and thus the defense was "illusory."254 Furthermore, the age verification defense provided by section 223(e)(5)(B)
was not economically feasible for most non-commercial information
providers to use, and therefore, the defense failed to sufficiently
narrow the statute's burden on speech. 2ss Ultimately, the Court
agreed with the district court's conclusions that "the defenses do
not constitute the sort of 'narrow tailoring' that will save an otherwise patently invalid unconstitutional provision. "256
At oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Government
urged that the Court should honor section 608 of the CDA-the
severability clause of the statute. 2S7 The Court declined to do so as
to section 223(d), opting to strike it down entirely because "indecent" speech receives constitutional protection. 258 The Court agreed
to sever the phrase "or indecent" from section 223(a), leaving the
remainder of section 223(a) intact because it related solely to obscene speech which is not entitled to First Amendment protection.259 However, the Court concluded that the severability provision
could do nothing else to save the remainder of sections 223(a) or

253.
254.

255.

256.
257.

258.
259.

ing themselves or their children to harmful material." [d. "The dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of ideas contradicts the factual basis of this
contention. The record demonstrates that the growth of the Internet has been
and continues to be phenomenal." [d.
See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2349-50.
See id. at 2349. "Tagging" means that a person could "encode their indecent
communications in a way that would indicate their contents, thus permitting
recipients to block their reception with appropriate software." [do. At the time
the case was before the district court, no such software was available. See id.
See id. Age verification is currently used by commercial providers of sexually
explicit material, and thus they would be protected by the statute. See ill. However, the Government failed to prove that the age verification actually precluded minors from casting themselves as adults. See id. "The Government
thus failed to prove that the proffered defense would significantly reduce the
heavy burden on adult speech produced by the prohibition on offensive displays." [do at 2350.
[do
See 47 U.S.C. § 608 (1994). Section 608 provided: "If any provision of this
chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter and the application of such provision to
other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby." [do
See ill.
See ill.
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223(d).260

IV. ANALYSIS
A. Discussion of Supreme Court s Holding and Rationale
The Supreme Court did not strike down the entire CDA.261 Instead, the Court struck down the "indecent" and "patently offensive" sections of the CDA because they were unconstitutionally overbroad. 262 However, the "obscenity" provisions of the CDA were not
challenged and remain good law. 263 In its holding, the majority olr
served how the Internet existed at the time the case was before the
Court. 264 All of the Justices agreed that age-verifying gateway technology was not widely available, particularly for non-commercial information providers. 26S It is not the Court's duty to forecast whether
technical developments might occur in the near future or in the
years or decades that follow. 266 The majority's position is defensible
inasmuch as it held that the CDA did not pass constitutional muster
because it contained undefined terms, and more importantly,
lacked narrowly tailored means to meet the governmental purpose
of the statute. 267
However, one may accurately hypothesize that if the Court
found that gateway technology was available to all Internet speakers
when the case was before it, the CDA may have withstood the
Court's First Amendment scrutiny. This type of technology could
provide the Government with the narrowly tailored means necessary
for legislation to survive strict scrutiny because it would make the
statutory defenses effective for all information providers. Therefore,
a question arises as to whether the Court genuinely intends to provide the Internet with such broad protection in the future. For example, the Court affirmed in Reno that the Government has a valid
interest in protecting children from harmful material. 268 Therefore,
access by minors to material on the Internet that is not obscene,
260. See id. The Court also refused to limit its holding to a "judicially defined set
of specific applications." [d.
261. See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 177.
264. See supra notes 133-53 and accompanying text.
265. Such software was not available, but Internet filtering software for information
receivers was available. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2349.
266. See id.
267. See supra notes 222-50 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.

308

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 28

but still harmful to them, can be regulated if the legislation containing these restrictions is appropriately drafted by Congress.
In enacting the CDA, Congress simply did not research the
myriad of issues involved with such an expansive regulation. 269 The
provisions were not the result of any Congressional hearings, and
thus no legislative findings existed to provide factual support for the
CDA.270 In failing to draft clear, concise constitutional legislation,
the Court once again sent a message to Congress that ill-prepared
legislation will not be tolerated when it unduly restricts information
flowing to and from the marketplace of ideas.271
B. Alternative Approach

The Reno decision was not without a differing viewpoint. Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a separate opinion, joined by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, concurring in part and dissenting in part
with the majority opinion. 272 Justice O'Connor concluded that the
"indecent" provision of the CDA was not unconstitutional on its
face.273 Her opinion began with the observation that section 223(d)
was really two separate provisions and labeled them as the "specific
person" provision and the "display" provision.274 She reasoned that
each provision deserved a separate constitutional analysis. 27S Furthermore, she observed that the statute was not written to prevent
adults from accessing indecent material, but rather "the undeniable
purpose of the CDA [was] to segregate indecent material on the Internet into certain areas that minors cannot access. "276 The legislation created "adult zones," and the Court has upheld analogous
zoning legislation in the past, but only when they meet the requirements of the First Amendment.277 In Justice O'Connor's opinion,
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

See supra
See supra
See supra
See Reno

notes 28 and 158-60 and accompanying text.
notes 28 and 158-60 and accompanying text.
notes 238-50 and accompanying text.
v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351-57 (1997) (O'Connor, j., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
See id. at 2357 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See ill. at 2352 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See ill. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id.
See id. at 2353-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Many
states have enacted legislation which in effect creates these adult zones. See,
e.g., MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 416E (1996) (prohibiting minors in establishments where certain enumerated acts are performed or portrayed); MD. ANN.
CoDE art. 27, § 416B (1996) (denying minors access to speech deemed harmful to minors).
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CONCLUSION

Reno v. ACLU addressed whether sections 223 (a) (1) and 223(d)
of the CDA impinged on the First Amendment rights of adults. 349
More importantly, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the
first governmental attempt to regulate pornography on the most expansive, technologically advanced mode of communication known
to this day.3so The Supreme Court held that both sections 223(a)(1)
and 223(d) were overbroad to the extent they covered undefined
"indecent" material, and as a result violated the First Amendment
because they could suppress constitutionally protected speech. 3S1
The Court recognized the importance of protecting minors
from harmful material, but refused to "'reduc[e] the adult population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children. "'352 This refusal reaffirms the principle that the government may regulate constitutionally protected speech, but only when such a regulation serves a
legitimate government purpose and is narrowly tailored by the least
restrictive means available. 3S3 Only time will tell whether the newly
adopted Internet Indecency Act will survive constitutional scrutiny.
However, it appears as though the government has taken adequate
steps to assure that the Act will survive a constitutional challenge
and has cured the defects present in the CDA that proved fatal to
its intentions in Reno.

Scott A. Shail

349.
350.
351.
352.

353.

younger. CompaTe 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B) (1997) (CDA). with 47 U.S.C. §
231(d)(7) (1999) (COPA).
See supra notes 4-23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17~270 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17~270 and accompanying text.
Reno v. ACLU. 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997) (quoting Denver Area Educ.
Telecomms. Consortium. Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 759 (1996) (quoting Sable
Communications of Cal.. Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989»).
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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the Court should uphold this type of zoning law "if (i) [the statute] ... does not unduly restrict adult access to the material; and
(ii) minors have no First Amendment right to read or view the
banned material. "278
justice O'Connor proceeded to discuss the "unzoneable" nature of cyberspace. 279 In comparing prior case law with Reno,2Bll justice O'Connor stated that previous zoning laws existed "in the physical world, a world with two characteristics that make it possible to
create 'adult zones': geography and identity. "281 These characteristics
allow owners to exclude minors from their establishments without
affecting the First Amendment rights of adults.282
Adults are unduly affected by the CDA provisions because these
two principles---geography and identity---do not exist in cyberspace.283 justice O'Connor recognized the future possibility of constructing barriers on the Internet to screen user identification, thus
making cyberspace potentially zoneable.284 However, these advancements have not been fully developed, nor were th~y available to all
Internet users at the time Reno was decided.28S As a result, this technology did not save the "display" provision, section 223 (d)(l)(B) ,
from constitutional failure. 286 Thus, Justice O'Connor agreed with
the majority that this section of the CDA caused speakers to completely refrain from using indecent speech, and as a result, unduly
affected the First Amendment rights of adults.287
Sections 223(a)(1)(B) and 223(d)(l)(A) were the subject of
justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion because she reasoned that
they were not unconstitutional in every application. 288 justice
O'Connor noted that for section 223(a)(1)(B) to apply, the information sender must have known the recipient was under eighteen
278. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2352-53 (O'Connor, j., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
279. See id. at 2353-54 (O·Connor. j., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
280. See id. at 2353 (O'Connor, j.. concurring in part. dissenting in part).
281. Id.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 2353-54. (O'Connor, j.. concurring in part. dissenting in part). These
advancements are known as "gateway" technology. and includes adult verification numbers, screening software such as Cyber Patrol and SurfWatch, and
Web browsers with screening capabilities. See id.
286. See id. at 2354 (O·Connor. j.. concurring in part, dissenting in part).
287. See id.
288. See id.
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years 01d. 289 Justice O'Connor opined that section 223(d) should be
construed to require this knowledge as well, even though this requirement was lacking from the language of the statute. 290 Justice
O'Connor reasoned that when the provisions were read to require
knowledge, they would be no different than the statute in Ginsberg
as applied to a conversation between an adult and a minor.291
However, when more than one adult participates in a conversation that is subsequently joined by a minor, the Ginsberg 292 analogy
is destroyed because the CDA requires adults to cease using indecent speech immediate1y.293 Therefore, in this situation, the CDA
provisions restrict the rights of adults to use indecent speech over
the Internet. 294 However, when an adult's constitutional right to engage in indecent speech would not normally be affected by a statute, a facial challenge to the statute will faiJ.295 As a result, the
Court has the authority to strike, as unconstitutional, portions of
the CDA as they pertain to communications between adults and uphold those same provisions as they pertain to communications involving minors.296 Based on this authority, Justice O'Connor "sustain [ed] the 'indecency transmission' and 'specific person'
provisions to the extent they apply to the transmission of Internet
communications where the party initiating the communication
knows that all of the recipients are minors. "297

289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 2355 ("Restricting what the adult may say to the minors in no way restricts the adult's ability to communicate with other adults. He is not prevented from speaking indecently to other adults in a chat room (because
there are no other adults participating in the conversation) and he remains
free to send indecent e-mails to other adults.") (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
292. See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
293. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2355 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). "If they did not, they could be prosecuted under the 'indecency transmission' and 'specific person' provisions for any indecent statements they
make to the group, since they would be transmitting an indecent message to
specific persons, one of whom is a minor." Id.
294. See id.
295. See ill. ; see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (stating that
a facial challenge to legislation succeeds only if the challenger shows that no
circumstances exist under which the statute is valid). .
296. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2355 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, litc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985».
297. Id. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

1998]

Reno v. ACLU

311

Justice O'Connor then analyzed the COA under the second
prong of the valid zoning law inquiry, which is whether the statute
interferes with minors' First Amendment rights. 298 She concluded
that "the CDA does not burden a substantial amount of minors'
constitutionally protected speech. "299 Justice O'Connor referred to
Ginsberg in which the Court determined that minors may be denied
access to certain material deemed obscene as to minors, and established the test for determining what materials fall into this category.300 Justice O'Connor reasoned that the CDA could potentially
ban speech that minors have a constitutional right to access because
Congress failed to clarify what constitutes "patently offensive"
speech under the COA 301 This potential interference, however, was
not enough for plaintiffs to successfully prove that the COA was
overbroad. 302 Justice O'Connor observed that the plaintiffs simply
failed to prove substantial overbreadth concerning minors' speech
rights, and thus a facial challenge of the CDA should fai1. 303 Justice
O'Connor concluded, under the zoning law analysis, the "display,"
"indecency transmission," and "specific person" provisions were unconstitutional as applied to communications between adults.304 However, the "indecency transmission" and "specific person" provisions
were constitutionally valid as applied to communications between an
adult and one or more minors, and thus those portions of the statute should be upheld as constitutiona1. 30S
Justice O'Connor's concurring and dissenting opinion provided
an alternative overbreadth analysis of the COA306 This reasoning adheres to the principle that a statute may be declared unconstitutional in part, but otherwise left intact. 307 Justice O'Connor's opinion accurately demonstrates a flexible, realistic approach to
298.
299.
300.
301.

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

See id.
Id. at 2357 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See id. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See id. An example of speech that a minor has a right to access, but would be
banned by the CDA, is any speech that has some redeeming value for minors
and does not appeal to their prurient interest. See itl.
See id. "Our cases require a proof of 'real' and 'substantial' overbreadth." Id.
(citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973».
See id.
See id. at 2357 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See id.
See supra notes 271-304 and accompanying text.
See Rerw, 117 S. Ct. at 2355 (O'Connor, j., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985».
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determining the constitutionality of statutes, which effectively preserves the congressional intent behind such legislation.
C. Impact of Reno v. ACLU
In Reno v. ACLU, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
the framework for conducting a constitutional analysis of overbroad
legislative enactments under the First Amendment. 308 The effect of
this designed constitutional inquiry is twofold: (1) overbroad legislation that the Court strictly scrutinizes will be deemed unconstitutional under the First Amendment if it chills protected free speech,
unless Congress narrowly tailors the provision so that the statute infringes such rights in the least intrusive way possible, and (2) Congress is forced to carefully investigate the subject matter of a statute
to ensure the means for avoiding legislative overbreadth are clearly
available to all who may fall within the reach of the statutory language in order to survive constitutional scrutiny.
It would be difficult to argue that the result of the Reno decision surprised First Amendment scholars, especially in light of Sable. 300 Although the version of the CDA in Sable created a complete
ban on indecent material, and thus is facially distinguishable from
the version of the CDA at issue in Reno, the facts in Reno illustrate
that the CDA created a total ban on constitutionally protected
speech.310 Congress failed to document that the technology existed
for the ·CDA, in its current form, to pass constitutional scrutiny.3I1
According to the information before the Court, there was no viable
age verification process to protect information providers, and therefore the statutory affirmative defenses were not an effective means
to avoid prosecution. 312 Thus, the cumulative effect of all these factors created an identical restriction on speech as did the statute that
was at issue in Sable.313
The Reno decision directly benefits Internet users who choose
to provide indecent material to others. The Supreme Court expressly stated that the Internet deserves far more protection from
regulation than does broadcasting. 314 Therefore, it is highly probable that potential Internet regulation supporters will be unable to
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

See supra
See supra
See Reno,
See supra
See Reno,
See supra
See. Reno,

notes 170-270 and accompanying text.
notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
117 S. Ct. at 2347-50.
note 284 and accompanying text.
117 S. Ct. at 2349-50.
notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
117 S. Ct. at 2343.
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draw any support from prior cases upholding the regulation of
broadcast media. This reduces the amount of legal authority at
their disposal and greatly reduces the chances of mounting successful defenses against the constitutional challenges to Internet
regulations.
On the other hand, Reno does provide hope for those who support regulating the Internet. Once computer software is available to
the average Internet user that allows persons to verify the age of a
recipient, statutes such as the CDA will enjoy greater judicial support. This software will allow an Internet user wishing to send indecent messages to be reasonably sure that another user with whom
the individual is communicating is an adult. This assurance will allow people to communicate with one another without the threat of
prosecution under a statute that regulates communication, thus
avoiding forced silence upon people and violations of the First
Amendment. Until such software is available to all Internet users,
whether commercial or non-commercial, legislation seeking to regulate protected speech communicated over this medium of communication will not succeed.
Reno also affected the contemporary political arena, compelling
the legislative and executive branches to carefully consider First
Amendment values as they create and administer regulations of the
Internet.31S Within six months of the Court's decision in Reno, Vice
President AI Gore announced that the Clinton administration would
join members of the online industry to form "Kids Online," a national effort to make the Internet and online services "safer for children. "316 Rather than calling for increased regulation of the In-

315. See infra notes 314-22 and accompanying text.
316. Kids Online to get Administration Support, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 2, 1997, available in
1997 WL 13781115. Participating members of the online industry include
America Online, the American Library Association, the WaIt Disney Company,
and Time Warner, Inc. See id. Each company will design and provide its own
protective program for children. See id. Additionally, Gore praised the "use of
Internet blocking and screening," and stated that the "use of such devices by
parents 'is not censorship.'" Gore at Summit Conference Sets Kids Online Policy,
CoMM. DAILY, Dec. 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13781201. Gore further commented: "It's called 'parenting,' and blocking was 'fully protected' by the First
Amendment." It! Furthermore, Gore praised "Web sites that have started to
rate themselves and the online industry for its decision to adopt a formal policy statement showing 'zero tolerance' for child pornography and that Internet service providers will 'be working closely with law enforcement to report and pursue any suspicious activity. '" Id.
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ternet,317 the Clinton Administration's cooperative approach to the
problems posed by indecent material on the Internet reflects a realization that only with the online industry's cooperation can there be
effective restrictions without a "nationwide backlash" occurring
"that could stunt the growth of [the] Internet."318 Along with parents,319 this coalition will.move toward strengthening the Reno
majority's conclusion that Internet-filtering software is a viable alternative to a complete ban of indecent speech.
D. Congressional IWponse

The Reno Court was mainly concerned with two characteristics
of the CDA.320 First, the CDA covered commercial and noncommercial information providers and applied the same level of liability to these two categories. 321 Second, the CDA failed to provide
any definition of "indecent" and omitted the requirement that "patently offensive" material must lack socially redeeming value. 322 In
response to these concerns, the legislative branch of the federal
317. Vice President Gore was quick to· recognize that this program "should follow
dictates of court decisions and [the] Constitution." [d. Gore attacked groups
that support increased government involvement, stating "that government has
to follow court rulings and 'we must find methods to keep our children safe
that do not infringe on the free speech of others.... [d.
318. [d. The administration openly supported a "3rd way" policy that calls for industry lead~rs to work alongside the government in solving the present
problems with children and the Internet. See id.
319. Some would contend that Reno shifts the responsibility of keeping children
away from sexuall~xplicit material on the Internet to parents. See Ann Gregor, Filtering Software Can Help Make Surfing Safer for Kids, HOME PC, Nov. I,
1997, available in 1997 WL 2968922. This responsibility has spurred a movement in the online industry to develop new and improved Internet-filtering
software. See id. Several examples of available programs parents can use to accomplish this task are Microsystems' Cyber Patrol, Solid Oak Software's CyberSitter, Net Nanny Ltd.'s Net Nanny, Spyglass's SurfWatch, and Security
Software Systems' Cyber Sentinel. See id. These programs all share certain similarities so that:
As children surf, the filters compare what's streaming into the computer against lists of proscribed words, phrases and Internet addresses. If the software finds a match, the page won't appear onscreen. Some programs get parents started with extensive lists of undesirable sites; others rely more on users to create their own lists, citing the vast differences in what parents consider objectionable.
[d.
320. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2324, 2345, 2347 (1997).
321. See ill. at 2347.
322. See ill. at 2345.
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government accepted the Supreme Court's challenge issued in
Reno. The United States Senate Commerce Committee approved
Senate Bill 1482, a bill written by Senator Dan Coats of Indiana that
amends section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934, and is "designed to prevent indecent material from being conveyed over the
Internet" to people under seventeen years old. 323 Senate Bill 1482 is
known as the Internet Indecency Act, and it outlaws the commercial
distribution of pornography over the Internet to minors. 324
The Internet Indecency Act appears to be a reincarnation of
the Communications Decency Act designed to withstand constitutional challenge. "325 Senate Bill 1482 is modeled after the New York
statute that the Supreme Court upheld in Ginsberg v. New York with
323. Senate Panel OK's School Filtering, Internet Decency Bills, Funds NGI, EDUC. TECH.
NEWS, Mar. 18, 1998, availahle in 1998 WL 10242373.
324. S. 1482, 105th Cong. (1998) provides:
Section 1. Prohibition on Commercial Distribution on the World
Wide Web of Material that is Harmful to Minors. (a) Prohibition- (1)
IN GENERAL - Section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47
U.S.C. 223) is amended -(A) by redesignating subsections (e), (f),
(g), and (h) as subsections (f),(g), (h), and (i), respectively; and (B)
by inserting after subsection (d) the following new section (e): (e)
(1) Whoever in interstate or foreign commerce in or through the
World Wide Web is engaged in the business of the commercial distribution of material that is harmful to minors shall restrict access to
such material by persons under 17 years of age. (2) Any person who
violates paragraph (1) shall be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than six months, or both... (5)it is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this subsection that the defendant restricted access to material that is harmful to minors persons under 17
years of age by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account,
adult access code, or adult personal identification number or in accordance with such other procedures as the Commission may prescribe. (6) This subsection may not be construed to author the Commission to regulate in any manner the content of information
provided on the World Wide Web. (7) For purposes of this subsection: (A) The term "material that is harmful to minors" means any
communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording,
writing, or other matter of any kind that -(i) takeri as a whole and
with respect to minors, appeal to a prurient interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion; (ii) depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive
way with respect to what is suitable for minors, an actual or simulated
sexual act or sexual contact, actual or simulated normal or perverted
sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals; and (iii) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

It!
325. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
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the Reno Court's remarks in mind. 326 The statute in Ginsberg prohibited the selling to minors under seventeen years of age material
considered obscene as to minors but not to adults. 327
In Reno, the Supreme Court found four primary differences between the CDA and the Ginsberg statute,328 all of which Senate Bill
1482 clearly addresses. 329 First, like the statute in Ginsberg,3'30 Senate
Bill 1482 does not prohibit parents from obtaining material on the
Internet for their children,331 unlike section 223(a)(2) of the CDA
which criminalized such parental activity.332 Second, the scope of
Senate Bill 1482 is clearly limited to commercial transactions333 as
was the statute upheld in Ginsberg.334 The CDA was directed at both
commercial and non-commercial activity.33S Third, the Ginsberg statute's "harmful to minors" standard included the requirement that
the material "lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value," thus protecting material containing any of these serious
value elements. 336 Section (e)(7) of Senate Bill 1482 specifically
adopts this requirement of the Ginsberg statute. 337 On the other
hand, the CDA did not contain a definition of "indecent" or a "social value" exception to the "patently offensive" provision. 338 Lastly,
the Ginsberg statute defined minors as people under the age of seventeen,339 and Senate Bill 1482 adopts the same definition of minors. 34O In contrast, the scope of the CDA included eighteen-year0Ids. 341
Furthermore, Senate Bill 1482 provides the narrow-tailoring
that the Court has required in the past when testing the constitutionality of legislation. 342 Section (e)(5) of the bill provides certain
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

See supra notes 3144 and accompanying text.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 33041 and accompanying text.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See supra note 324.
See supra note 5.
See supra note 324.
See supra note 85 and accompanying 'text.
See supra note 5.
See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 324.
See supra note 5.
See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
See supra note 5.
See supra notes 32-132 and accompanying text.
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affirmative defenses 343 that the Reno Court acknowledged as both
technically and economically feasible for commercial information
providers. 344 The scope of Senate Bill 1482 is explicitly limited to
commercial activity on the World Wide Web, and therefore the affirmative defenses will protect those providers who follow its terms
from prosecution. 345 Senate Bill 1482 is specifically designed to meet
the parameters established by the Supreme Court in past decisions346 and appears to be constitutional under the First Amendment because of its adherence to the Court's commands in both
Reno and Ginsberg. This Bill eventually became part of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA)347 and was immediately challenged. 348
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

See supra note 324.
See supra note 255.
See supra note 342.
See supra notes 32841 and accompanying text.
See 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1999).
See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999); ACLU v. Reno, 1998
WL 813423 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1998). The ACLU represented individuals, entities, organizations, World Wide Web site operators, and content providers that
post, read, and respond to Web sites with information on obstetrics, gynecology, and sexual health. See Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 484. The plaintiffs argued
that the statute was unconstitutional for the same reasons as CDA-a restriction on speech "harmful to minors" burdens speech that is protected for
adults. See id. at 478-79. Just before the COPA was about to go into effect, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a
temporary restraining order. See Reno, 1998 WL 813423 at *1. The court later
granted a preliminary injunction, preventing the enforcement of the statute
until a final adjudication of the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. See Reno, 31 F.
Supp. 2d at 499. The court held that the plaintiffs established "a substantial
likelihood that they will be able to show that COPA imposes a burden on free
speech that is protected for adults." Id. at 495. Like the Interent Indecency
Act, the district court and commentators recognized that COPA was clearly
Congress' response to the Supreme Court striking down the CDA in Reno v.
ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). See, e.g., Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476-77; Pierre J.
Lorieau, Reno v. ACLU: Champion of Free Speech ur Blueprint fur Speech Regulation
on the Internetr, 7 J.L. POL'y 209, 247 (1998); Richard Raysman and Peter
Brown, Regulating Internet Content, Privacy; Taxes, N.Y.LJ. Sept. 21, 1998, at 1.
For example, the COPA explicitly defines "material that is harmful to minors,"
using some of the Supreme Court's criticisms of Reno. See 47 U.S.C. § 231 (6).
While the CDA used general terms such as "indecent" and "patently offensive" to describe material harmful to minors, the COPA incorporated specific
guidelines, such as a lack of serious literary, political, or scientific value for
minors. for courts to consider. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(I)(B) (1998)
(CDA). with 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (1999) (COPA). Furthermore. while the
CDA regulated distribution of materials to eighteen-year-olds, the COPA applies only to material distributed to individuals seventeen years old and

